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We study the allocation of collectively owned indivisible goods when monetary transfers are
possible. We restrict our attention to incentive compatible mechanisms which allocate the goods
e¢ ciently. Among these mechanisms, we characterize those that respect the identical-preferences
lower-bound: each agent should be at least as well o⁄ as in an hypothetical economy where all
agents have the same preference as hers, no agent envies another, and the budget is balanced.
JEL Classi￿cations: C79, D61, D63.
Key words: welfare bounds, collective ownership, allocation of indivisible goods and money,
NIMBY problems, imposition of tasks, the Groves mechanisms, the identical-preferences lower-
bound, k-fairness.
1 Introduction
In problems where jointly owned resources are allocated, the society cares about the welfare levels
attained by its members. The study of welfare lower bounds has been carried out in several models but
for the case of Groves mechanisms, such an analysis was missing, which our paper intends to provide.
We have in mind situations where either all the agents have equal rights over some indivisible goods
or all the agents are collectively responsible for the completion of a given set of tasks. A ￿center￿
(government, jurisdictional authority, etc.) needs to allocate these heterogenous indivisible goods (or
tasks), monetary transfers are allowed to restore fairness, and agents have quasi-linear preferences
over the sets of objects and transfers.
Examples include auctions held to allocate water entitlements to farmers, imposition of tasks
as in government requisitions and eminent domain proceedings1, as well as the following allocation
problems: social services to the members of society (e.g. municipality child-care in Sweden, Biel,
et al, 1997), community housing, charitable goods and money among the needy, ￿shing or pollution
permits, resources in centrally planned economies, commonly owned indivisible goods in cooperative
enterprises such as cooperative supported agriculture, inheritance among heirs, landing rights to
airlines, job and wage assignments etc.
Another example is the allocation of indivisible public goods or bads to localities.2 For instance,
consider choosing the locations of desirable facilities or events (state capitals, parks, international
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part of an earlier working paper entitled "Groves Mechanisms and Welfare Bounds in a Variable Population Setting".
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1Government requisition is the government￿ s demand to use goods and services of the civilians usually in times
of national emergency such as natural disasters and wars. Eminent Domain is government￿ s right to seize private
property, without the owner￿ s consent, for public use (such as to build a road or a public utility over a privately held
land), provided owners receive just compensation.
2Assume that there is no question of whether or how much of the public good is to be provided (e.g., building a
waste disposal site, siting state capitals). The only question is which locality will provide what public goods and what
the compensations are.
1airports, etc.) or the siting problem of noxious facilities (prisons, hazardous materials facilities
such as chemical process facilities, waste disposal sites, nuclear facilities, etc.), also called as the
￿not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)￿problem. Although all the members of the society have the same
rights/responsibilities over the public goods/bads, only the hosting localities will experience the
bene￿ts/costs. Hence, localities have an incentive to misrepresent their preferences to manipulate
the allocation rule in their favor. Monetary transfers like taxes and subsidies can provide incentive
compatibility and restore fairness by distributing the bene￿ts/costs over all agents.
Without loss of generality, we focus on the allocation of heterogenous tasks (as in eminent do-
main, government requisition, or NIMBY problem) among agents based on their reported costs of
performing the tasks. When agents have equal rights or responsibilities, society is generally con-
cerned with the equity of an allocation and the resulting welfare levels of people. Several axioms
(such as no-envy and egalitarian-equivalence)3 are suggested to measure the justness of an allocation.
However, a mechanism which satis￿es these fairness axioms may still generate welfare levels that are
arbitrarily small or large. An allocation which guarantees a minimum level of welfare to all agents
may be preferable to an allocation which satis￿es no-envy and yields ￿socially unacceptable￿low
levels of welfare to some agents. Most societies care about guaranteeing a minimum level of welfare
to its members for solidarity and compassionate reasons. Indeed, this minimum guaranteed welfare
can be seen as an indicator of how developed that society is.
In the classical fair division problem, guaranteeing to each agent her utility at the equal split of
the resources is one of the oldest axioms in the fairness literature and has been well-studied4. In
economies where indivisible goods and money are allocated, equal division is not well de￿ned. In
such economies, an alternative fairness axiom is the identical-preferences lower-bound, introduced by
Moulin (1990). Pick an agent and consider a ￿reference economy￿where all agents have preferences
identical to hers. Since all agents have equal rights and the same preference, they should enjoy the
same welfare. Find the common welfare level enjoyed, if objects are allocated e¢ ciently (assignment-
e¢ ciency) and budget-balance is satis￿ed (total transfer is zero in all economies). One can argue that
this Pareto-e¢ cient and egalitarian (the utilities of all agents are equal) welfare distribution in the
reference economy is equitable and should be a benchmark for the actual economy. Since no agent
is responsible for the heterogeneity in the preferences in the actual economy, they should all receive
at least their benchmark welfare levels (Identical-preferences lower-bound, IPLB).
To be able to determine an allocation where objects are assigned e¢ ciently and welfare levels
respect the desired lower bound, inducing the agents to report their preferences truthfully is utmost
importance. One of the most appealing incentive compatibility constraints is strategy-proofness
(truthful reporting of preference is a weakly dominant strategy for all agents). It is well-known that
when preferences are quasi-linear, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms (simply referred to as the
Groves mechanisms) are the only mechanisms that are assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof.
Our main result (Theorem 1, Section 3) is the characterization of assignment-e¢ cient and
strategy-proof mechanisms that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound and minimize the
de￿cit for each economy.
Our paper is related to a strand of literature that covers the siting problem of noxious facilities
(see, for instance, Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002; Minehart and Neeman, 2002; Laurent-Luchetti
and Leroux, forthcoming; Sakai, forthcoming). The papers in this literature, generally focus either
on implementing the e¢ cient outcome in Nash equilibrium (hence, requiring complete information)
or on budget-balance rather than assignment-e¢ ciency. We consider situations where e¢ ciency is
one of the fundamental concerns. In certain situations, complete information may not be available,
for instance, a city may not know the true costs of other cities to host a noxious facility. Hence,
implementing the e¢ cient outcome in Nash equilibrium may not be feasible in real life. Strategy-
3No-envy (Foley, 1967) requires that no agent prefers another agent￿ s bundle to her own. Egalitarian-equivalence
(Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978) requires that each agent should be indi⁄erent between her bundle and a common
reference bundle. See also Yengin (2010, 2011a,b).
4See for example Steinhaus (1948), Dubins and Spanier (1961), and Moulin (1991).
2proofness solves this problem since agents need only know their own costs. Hence, strategy-proof
and assignment-e¢ cient mechanisms, i.e. the Groves mechanisms, realize the e¢ cient assignment of
tasks in such situations. The problem with Groves mechanisms is that they typically do not satisfy
budget-balance. Thus, when choosing a mechanism, the center needs to consider the trade-o⁄s
between lack of strategy-proofness or assignment-e¢ ciency of the mechanisms previously proposed
in the literature with the lack of budget-balance of Groves mechanisms. If e¢ ciency is deemed as
essential in incomplete information environments, the choice would lean towards Groves mechanisms,
especially if the lack of budget balance can be mitigated in some way. We provide such a mitigation
by characterizing Groves mechanisms that minimize the budget de￿cit in each economy among all
Groves mechanisms respecting IPLB. Moreover, when there is a single noxious facility to locate (as
is the case studied in most of the papers in the literature), the budget de￿cit is bounded above by
the di⁄erence of the second lowest cost and the lowest cost of hosting the facility. When costs are
additive or subadditive and if the externalities of agents are negligible, then the de￿cit would be
almost zero.
The mechanisms we characterize have other appealing properties such as, when costs are additive
or subadditive, they satisfy order-preservation (an agent with lower costs is not worse o⁄than an agent
with higher costs) and no-envy; and when costs are additive, they are 1￿fair (agents￿welfare levels
are at least as much as the one at a Pareto-e¢ cient and egalitarian allocation, Porter et al, 2004) and
generate bounded de￿cits. Such fairness issues have not been addressed by the other mechanisms in
the NIMBY literature cited above. Hence, we extend the existing literature on NIMBY problems in a
non-trivial way by proposing Groves mechanisms that have desirable budget and fairness properties.
These mechanisms are appealing alternatives when Nash outcomes or ine¢ cient mechanisms are not
desirable choices for the center.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we present the model and the Groves mechanisms.
Section 3 presents our characterizations. In Section 4, we provide a verbal interpretation of our
mechanisms and compare our mechanisms with the related mechanisms proposed in the literature.
Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 Model
A ￿nite set of indivisible tasks is to be allocated among a ￿nite set of agents. All tasks must be
allocated. An agent can be assigned either no task, a single task, or more than one task. Each task
is assigned to only one agent. Let A be the ￿nite set of tasks, with jAj ￿ 1; and ￿;￿ be typical
elements of A: There are n ￿ 2 agents, let N = f1;2;:::;ng be the set of n agents. The number of
agents may be smaller than, equal to, or greater than the number of tasks.
Let 2A be the set of subsets of A. Each agent i has a cost function ci : 2A ! R+ with ci(;) = 0.5
We refer to such a cost function as unrestricted. Let Cun be the class of all such functions.
If for each A 2 (2An;), ci(A) =
P
￿2A
ci(f￿g), then ci is additive. If for each pair fA;A0g ￿ 2A with
A \ A0 = ;, ci(A [ A0) ￿ ci(A) + ci(A0), then ci is subadditive; and if for each fA;A0g ￿ 2A with
A\A0 = ;, ci(A[A0) ￿ ci(A)+ci(A0), then ci is superadditive. Let Cad; Csub; and Csup be the classes
of additive, subadditive, and superadditive cost functions, respectively. Let C be a generic element of
fCun;Cad;Csub;Csupg and domain CN be the n￿fold Cartesian product of C: Unless stated otherwise,
the results of this paper hold on any domain.
A cost pro￿le is a list c ￿ (c1;:::;cn) 2 CN where for each i 2 N; ci 2 C. A cost pro￿le
de￿nes an economy. For each i 2 N; let c￿i be the list of the cost functions of the agents in
Nnfig: For each c 2 CN; each i 2 N; and each ￿ 2 A; let c￿
i ￿ ci(f￿g), c￿ ￿ (ci(fag))i2N, and
c￿
￿i ￿ (cj(fag))j2Nnfig: For each k 2 f1;2;:::;ng; let c￿
[k] be the k-th cost in the ascending order of
5As usual, R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
3the costs in fc1(f￿g);:::;cn(f￿g)g. All ties are taken into account in this order, for instance, if there
are two agents whose costs are the lowest, then c￿
[1] = c￿
[2]:
There is a perfectly divisible good we call ￿money￿ . Let ti denote agent i0s consumption of the
good. We call ti agent i0s transfer. We think of a ￿center￿that assigns the tasks and determines
each agent￿ s transfer. If ti > 0; it is a transfer from the center to i; if ti < 0; jtij is a transfer from i
to the center.
Agent i￿ s utility when she is assigned the set of tasks Ai 2 2A (note that Ai may be empty) and
consumes ti 2 R is
u(Ai;ti;ci) = ￿ci(Ai) + ti:
For each A 2 2A; let A(A) = f(A0
i)i2N : for each i 2 N; A0
i 2 2A; for each pair fi;jg ￿ N;
A0
i \A0




i = Ag be the set of all possible distributions of A among the agents in N: An
assignment is a list (Ai)i2N 2 A(A): A transfer pro￿le is a list (ti)i2N 2 RN. An allocation is a list
(Ai;ti)i2N where (Ai)i2N is an assignment and (ti)i2N is a transfer pro￿le.
A mechanism is a function ’ ￿ (A;t) de￿ned over the domain of cost pro￿les CN that associates
with each economy an allocation: for each c 2 CN and each i 2 N, ’i(c) ￿ (Ai(c);ti(c)) 2 2A ￿ R:
For each c 2 CN and each A 2 2A; let W(c;A) be the minimal total cost generated among all










2.1 The Groves Mechanisms
In our setting, the only role of the center is to allocate the tasks and carry out transfers, hence we are
not concerned with the utility of the center. Therefore, we de￿ne e¢ ciency from the point of view of
the agents only. In our model, the utility of each agent is increasing in her transfer. Also, an agent￿ s
transfer and total transfer can be of any size. Hence, every allocation is Pareto-dominated by some
other allocation with higher transfers. Thus, there is no Pareto-e¢ cient allocation. However, we can
de￿ne a notion of e¢ ciency restricted to the assignment of the tasks. Since utilities are quasi-linear,
given any cost pro￿le c; an allocation that minimizes total cost is Pareto-e¢ cient for c among all
allocations with the same, or smaller, total transfer. Our ￿rst axiom requires mechanisms to choose
only such allocations.




Since costs are private information, an assignment-e¢ cient mechanism assigns the tasks so that
the actual total cost is minimal only if the agents report their true costs. Truthful reporting is also
essential to determine the correct welfare bounds. Then, a desirable property for a mechanism is
that no agent should ever bene￿t by misrepresenting her costs (Gibbard, 1973; Satterthwaite, 1975).
Strategy-proofness6: For each i 2 N, each c 2 CN; and each c0
i 2 C, u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’i(c0
i;c￿i);ci):
The Groves mechanisms were introduced by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), and Groves (1973). A
Groves mechanism chooses, for each economy, an e¢ cient assignment of the tasks. In the literature,
Groves mechanisms are sometimes de￿ned as correspondences that select all the e¢ cient assignments
in an economy. We work with single-valued Groves mechanisms and assume that each Groves mech-
anism is associated with a tie-breaking rule that determines which of the e¢ cient assignments (if
there are more than one) is chosen. Let T be the set of all possible tie-breaking rules and ￿ be a
typical element of this set.
6See Thomson (2005) for an extensive survey on strategy-proofness.
4The transfer of each agent determined by a Groves mechanism has two parts. First, each agent
pays the total cost incurred by all other agents at the assignment chosen by the mechanism. Second,
each agent receives a constant sum of money that does not depend on her own cost. This constant
can depend on the cost functions of the other agents or the population size.
For each i 2 N; let hi be a real-valued function de￿ned over the domain CN such that for each
c 2 CN; hi depends only on c￿i: Let h = (hi)i2N and H be the set of all such h:
The Groves mechanism associated with h 2 H and ￿ 2 T , Gh;￿:









= ￿W(c;A) + ci(A￿
i (c)) + hi(c￿i):
The following observation will be of much use. For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN;
u(G
h;￿
i (c);ci) = ￿W(c;A) + hi(c￿i): (1)
By equation (1), for each h 2 H; the mechanisms in fGh;￿g￿2T are Pareto-indi⁄erent7. That is,
the particular tie-breaking rule used is irrelevant in the determination of the utilities.
Since CN is convex, by Holmstr￿m (1979), a mechanism is assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof
on the domain CN if and only if it is a Groves mechanism. This result justi￿es our interest in the
Groves mechanisms.
3 The Identical-Preferences Lower-Bound
In the fairness literature, the following thought experiment is generally carried out to determine an
equitable welfare bound. First, society agrees on a basic set of fairness notions that should be applied
in a hypothetical ￿reference economy￿ . These fairness notions determine an allocation and associated
welfare levels in this reference economy. Then, these welfare levels are taken as a benchmark for the
actual economy.
In an economy where all agents have the same preference, fairness8 may require that they all
experience the same welfare. Since utilities are quasi-linear, two agents have identical preferences if
their cost functions are identical.
For each i 2 N and each ci 2 C; let ci 2 CN be agent i0s ￿reference￿economy in which all agents
have the same cost function ci: That is, ci ￿ (ci
j)j2N 2 CN is such that for each j 2 N; ci
j ￿ ci:
In economy ci; under assignment-e¢ ciency and budget-balance, a fair allocation would equally
distribute among the agents, the cost of an e¢ cient assignment through budget balancing transfers.
Then, each agent￿ s utility would be ￿
W(ci;A)
n : This is the common utility at a Pareto-e¢ cient and
egalitarian allocation at agent i￿ s reference economy.
Suppose in the actual economy, the preferences di⁄er from agent to agent. No agent is responsible
for the preferences of the others. Hence, no one should be worse than she is in her reference economy.
The identical-preferences lower-bound (Moulin; 1990) requires that this be the case.





7Let c 2 C









i;ci): The mechanisms ’ and ’





8Fairness notions such as no-envy, anonymity, or equal treatment of equals would imply this result.
5This lower bound has been studied in the problem of allocating indivisible goods when there is a
￿xed amount of money to be distributed and each agent can be assigned at most one object (see, for
instance, Thomson, 2004; Bevia, 1996). In exchange economies and in the problem of allocating a
single divisible good over which agents have single-peaked preferences, IPLB is equivalent to the equal-
division lower-bound (no agent￿ s welfare should be less than the one at equal-split of the resources),
which is also well-studied (see, for instance, Moulin and Thomson, 1988).
To characterize the Groves mechanisms that respect IPLB on the unrestricted domain, we need
the following notation:
Notation 1. For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un; let ci 2 Cun be such that for each A 2 2A;
ci(A) ￿ maxf0;W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g: (2)
For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un; let ci ￿ (ci
j)j2N be such that for each j 2 N; ci
j ￿ ci:
Let us explain how ci is calculated. First ￿nd the minimum total cost of allocating the objects
in A among the agents in Nnfig: This cost is W(c￿i;A): For each set of tasks A; to ￿nd ci(A); we ask
the following question: what is the minimum cost agent i could incur for performing the tasks in A;
such that if A was assigned to agent i and AnA was e¢ ciently distributed among the other agents,
the total cost achieved by this allocation is not smaller than W(c￿i;A): Hence, the cost function ci
speci￿es the minimum cost for each set of tasks A; such that when agent i joins the society Nnfig;
the cost of an e¢ cient assignment does not change, i.e. W(c￿i;A) = W(c￿i;ci;A):
The following example demonstrates the calculation of ci in equation (2).
Example 1. Let A = f￿;￿g and N = f1;2;3g: Let i = 3: Table 1a presents (c1;c2) and the
calculation of the corresponding ci: Table 1b presents (c0
1;c0




c1 10 17 12
c2 8 19 15
ci maxf0;12 ￿ 17g = 0 12 ￿ 8 = 4 12 ￿ 0 = 12
f￿g f￿g f￿;￿g
c0
1 4 7 12
c0
2 8 9 18
c0
i 12 ￿ 7 = 5 12 ￿ 4 = 8 12 ￿ 0 = 12
Table 1 (a) Table 1 (b)
Table 1: Cost functions in Example 1.
Table 1a: Here, W(c￿i;A) = 12 and is obtained by assigning both tasks to agent 1: Also,
W(c￿i;Anf￿g) = 17 (￿ is assigned to agent 1); W(c￿i;Anf￿g) = 8 (￿ is assigned to agent 2);
and of course, W(c￿i;AnA) = 0:
Even if fc1;c2g ￿ Csub, we have ci 2 Csup. Note that W(ci;A) = 4 (each task is assigned to a di⁄erent
agent). Also, W(ci;A) < W(c￿i;A):
Table 1b: Here, W(c￿i;A) = 12; W(c￿i;Anf￿g) = 7; and W(c￿i;Anf￿g) = 4: Even if
fc1;c2g ￿ Csup, we have ci 2 Csub. Note that W(ci;A) = 12 (A is assigned to one of the agents).
Also, W(ci;A) = W(c￿i;A): ￿
The next result presents the characterization of the class of Groves mechanisms that respect the
identical-preferences lower-bound on the unrestricted, the additive, and the subadditive domains.
6Lemma 1.
a) On the unrestricted domain, a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ respects the identical-preferences lower-
bound if and only if for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un;




b) Let C 2 fCad;Csubg: A Groves mechanism Gh;￿ respects the identical-preferences lower-bound on





Let us give the intuition of the result brie￿ y. By equation (1), Gh;￿ respects the identical-
preferences lower-bound if and only if for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) ￿ W(c;A)￿ 1
nW(ci;A):
However, checking whether this inequality holds is not enough since agents may lie about their costs.










The maximum value of the right-hand-side of this inequality is equal to the right-hand-side of inequal-
ity (3) on the unrestricted domain; and inequality (4) on the additive or the subadditive domain, or
when there is a single task to be allocated. Actually, on the additive domain, the right-hand-sides
of (3) and (4) are identical.9
Note that for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN; W(ci;A) ￿ ci(A) = W(c￿i;A): Hence, the right-hand-
side of inequality (3) is greater than the right-hand-side of (4).





i (c) = ￿(n￿1)W(c;A)+
P
i2N
hi(c￿i): Hence, to minimize de￿cit (i.e. total transfer) while respecting IPLB, the inequalities in
Lemma 1 should hold as equalities.
Next, we present the mechanisms that are our main interest:
Theorem 1. a) On the unrestricted domain, a Groves mechanism generates the minimal budget
de￿cit for each economy among all Groves mechanisms that respect the identical-preferences lower-
bound if and only if (3) holds as an equality.
b) On the additive or the subadditive domain, or when there is a single task to be allocated, a Groves
mechanism generates the minimal budget de￿cit for each economy among all Groves mechanisms that
respect the identical-preferences lower-bound if and only if (4) holds as an equality.
4 Interpreting the Mechanisms in Theorem 1
According to liberal-egalitarianism, fairness calls for eliminating welfare di⁄erentials that result from
factors for which agents are not held responsible and keeping the welfare di⁄erentials that are due
9On the superadditive domain, we could not come up with a compact formula for the right-hand-side of (5). In
general, characterizing Groves mechanisms on the superadditive domain is either technically or notationally complex.
Hence, papers analyzing Groves mechanisms generally restrict attention to either the single-object case and to the
additive domain (Porter, et al, 2004; Atlamaz and Yengin, 2008), or to the allocation of homogenous objects where
each agent can receive at most one object (Ohseto, 2006; Moulin, 2009), or to the subadditive domain (PÆpai, 2003).
7to the factors for which they are held responsible (see Fleurbaey, 1995). We can argue that the
mechanisms in Theorem 1 support this theory of distributive justice:
If a mechanism respects IPLB, then the worst-case welfare of an agent is the welfare in her
reference economy. In the reference economy, since all preferences are identical to hers and total
cost of tasks is equally distributed over agents, her welfare would only re￿ ect her own preference (for
which she is held responsible) and her equal share in the collective responsibility of the society over
the tasks. In the actual economy, preferences are not identical. Suppose in the actual economy, she
is guaranteed her reference welfare level. That is, the center insures her against the conditions of
the economy for which she is not responsible (i.e. the heterogeneity in preferences) while letting her
welfare to re￿ ect the factors for which she has a responsibility or right. Hence, this kind of welfare
level would support liberal-egalitarianism.
PÆpai (2003) characterizes Groves mechanisms that satisfy no-envy on the subadditive domain.
(By PÆpai, 2003, no Groves mechanism satis￿es no-envy on the unrestricted domain.) We argue in
Yengin (2011a) that no-envy supports the liberal-egalitarian view of holding agents responsible only
for their own preferences but not for the heterogeneity in the resources (the tasks). On the additive
and the subadditive domains, the mechanisms in Theorem 1b satisfy no-envy.10 Hence, for Groves
mechanisms, IPLB is compatible with this central notion of fairness, no-envy and this compatibility
is very good news for liberal-egalitarian theory since agents can be insured against both of the factors
for which they are not held responsible, namely the heterogeneity in preferences and in tasks.
Many Groves mechanisms respect IPLB. An example is the Pivotal mechanisms (also known as,
Vickrey mechanisms, Clarke mechanisms, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, Second-price sealed-
bid auctions). Let ￿ 2 T : When a Pivotal mechanism P￿ is used, each agent i￿ s utility is equal to
the reduction in the cost of an e¢ cient assignment when she joins the economy (i.e. her positive
externality on the economy): for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN; u(P￿
i (c);ci) = W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A):
To achieve this welfare, her transfer is
t￿
i (c) = W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A) + ci(A￿
i (c)): (6)
Hence, not only the center covers her cost of performing her assignment (ci(A￿
i (c)), but also she







[W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A)] + W(c;A) ￿ W(c;A) ￿ 0: (7)
That is, the center completely covers the total cost W(c;A) and also pays agents extra money. Hence,
no agent bears a share of the total cost. Therefore, Pivotal mechanisms are not appealing in situations
where all agents are jointly responsible both for the performance of the tasks and for the resulting
total cost. In such situations, the mechanisms in Theorem 1 can be used. Although, they can not
exactly distribute the total cost among agents (since no Groves mechanism is budget balanced), they
still let the total cost be shared by the agents and the center in a ￿fair￿way as explained below:
Suppose the center wants to ensure assignment-e¢ ciency and fairness. Let c 2 CN: Suppose an
agent i 2 N reports such a cost function that she is not assigned any task. Then, the cost of an
10On the additive or the subadditive domain, for Groves mechanisms, IPLB is neither compatible with egalitarianism
nor with A￿egalitarian-equivalence (i.e. the reference set of tasks is A in all economies) for A 2 (2
AnA): To see this
note that by Yengin (2011a,b), G
h;￿ is egalitarian if and only if there is ￿ 2 R such that for each i 2 N and each c 2 C
N;
hi(c￿i) = ￿: By IPLB and (4), ￿ ￿
n￿1
n W(c￿i;A) for each i 2 N and each c 2 C
N: Since there is no upper bound on
W(c￿i;A); such ￿ does not exist. Similarly, by Yengin (2010), for A 2 2
A; a Groves mechanism satis￿es A￿egalitarian-
equivalence if and only if there is ￿ 2 R such that for each i 2 N and each c 2 C









cj(A) for each i 2 N and each c 2 C
N: If A 6= A; such ￿ does not exist since keeping
the costs for A same, one can increase the costs of all other sets of tasks and raise W(c￿i;A) in an unbounded way.
8e¢ cient assignment in the actual economy is W(c￿i;A): Since i shares the joint responsibility with
the other agents for the completion of all the tasks, she should still pay her ￿fair￿share of the total
cost. What is this fair share?
Each agent is responsible for her own cost function and she shares the joint responsibility of
completing the tasks. No agent is responsible for other agents￿cost functions. Hence, an equal
share of the cost of an e¢ cient assignment when everyone had the same cost function as agent i (i.e.
1
nW(ci;A)) can be argued as agent i￿ s fair share that she should pay: Since i can misrepresent her
actual cost function, she would report b ci which makes her payment 1
nW(ci;A) minimal while still
allowing her not to be assigned any task. That is,
b ci = argmin
ci2C
fW(ci;A) subject to W(ci;c￿i;A) = W(c￿i;A)g: (8)
How does b ci look like?
￿ No matter what the domain is, b ci should be such that b ci(A) ￿ W(c￿i;A): Otherwise, we would
have W(b ci;c￿i;A) ￿ b ci(A) < W(c￿i;A) and contradict (8): To minimize W(b c i;A); she would report
b ci(A) = W(c￿i;A):
￿ When the domain is additive, if for some ￿ 2 A; b c ￿
i < (c￿
￿i)[1], then i would be assigned ￿ in
(b ci;c￿i). Hence, by (8), we must have for each ￿ 2 A; b c ￿
i = (c￿
￿i)[1]: Then, W(b c i;A) = W(c￿i;A).
￿ Let the domain be subadditive. Since costs are subadditive and all agents have the same costs
in b c i; then by assignment-e¢ ciency, all of the tasks should be assigned to only one agent in b c i. Thus,
W(b c i;A) = b ci(A) = W(c￿i;A):
￿ If the domain is unrestricted, then for (8) to be satis￿ed, b ci = ci where ci is as in (2). Then,
W(ci;A) ￿ W(c￿i;A) = W(ci;c￿i;A):
To sum up, if an agent is not assigned any task, then her fair transfer and her welfare would
be equal to ￿ 1
nW(b c i;A): She can always guarantee this welfare by reporting b ci: Suppose now, the
center also wants to guarantee truthful reporting of the costs and induce agent i to report her actual
cost ci, in which case i would be assigned A￿
i (c): If her transfer in this case is ci(A￿
i (c))￿ 1
nW(b c i;A);
then she would be indi⁄erent between reporting b ci or ci: To give her an added incentive to report the
true cost function, the center can pay her the positive externality she would have in the economy by
reporting true costs. Then, her transfer would be
t
h;￿
i (c) = ￿
1
n
W(b c i;A) + W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A) + ci(A￿
i (c)): (9)
The transfer in (9) is the transfer prescribed by the mechanisms in Theorem 1. First, each agent
i pays her fair share, the share in her reference economy, namely 1
nW(b c i;A): Then, if she is assigned
any set of tasks, the center pays her the positive externality she generates on the economy and covers
her cost. This second part of her transfer is same as what a Pivotal mechanism prescribes. Hence,
the transfer speci￿ed in (9) and the resulting utility di⁄er from the transfer and utility prescribed by
a Pivotal mechanism by the term ￿ 1
nW(b c i;A):
Note that if the externality W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A) of an agent is very small (as it generally is in
large populations), the transfer of an agent is approximately equal to her reimbursement for her own
actual cost minus her share of the total cost in her reference economy (her fair share). Also, on
the additive, or the subadditive domain, for each i 2 N; W(b c i;A) = W(c￿i;A): Hence, on these
domains, if the externality of an agent is negligible, then her disutility is an equal share of the total
cost.













W(b c i;A): (10)
9Note that on the unrestricted, the additive, or the subadditive domain, for each i 2 N;










Hence, there is budget de￿cit. But this de￿cit is smaller than the de￿cit generated by a Pivotal mech-





[W(c￿i;A)￿W(c;A)]: Informally speaking, when the population is large, for each i 2 N; the
di⁄erence W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A) would be negligible and hence the budget would be almost balanced
in large populations. Such a property does not hold for the Pivotal mechanisms.
When total transfer is as in (10), the center covers the actual total cost and also pays each agent
her externality just like in the Pivotal mechanisms. But on top of that, the center collects the average
of the total costs in the reference economies of all agents. Hence, the burden of the tasks is shared by
the agents and the center, and the center motivates people to report their true costs by paying their
externalities. While each agent pays a cost share as if there is no heterogeneity in the preferences,
the center covers the di⁄erence between these payments and the actual total cost. This way, the
center insures the agents against the conditions of the economy for which they are not responsible.
4.1 Comparing Mechanisms in Theorem 1 with Related Mechanisms in the Lit-
erature
Our mechanisms are related to the class of mechanisms that are introduced by Porter et al. (2004)
and characterized by Atlamaz and Yengin (2008). Let k 2 f2;3;:::;ng and ￿ 2 T . Let Fk;￿ = Gh;￿
be such that for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN;







Let Fk ￿ fFk;￿g￿2T be the class of these mechanisms. For each k 2 f2;3;:::;ng; on any domain,
mechanisms in Fk satisfy the k￿fairness property introduced by Porter et al. (2004):
Let k 2 f1;2;:::;ng:






One can see that on the additive domain or when there is a single task, the mechanisms in
Theorem 1b are same as the mechanisms in F2: These mechanisms have some remarkable properties
(see Corollary 3 and Theorems 2 and 3, in Atlamaz and Yengin; 2008).
On the additive domain, Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) show that the mechanisms in F2 are not
only 2￿fair but also 1￿fair. That is, agents￿welfare levels are at least as much as the one at a
Pareto-e¢ cient and egalitarian allocation. Hence, they are the most fair ones in the Rawlsian sense
(see Atlamaz and Yengin, 2008, for a detailed discussion).11 On this domain, the mechanisms in
F2 also satisfy order preservation: for each fi;jg ￿ N and each c 2 CN; if ci(A) ￿ cj(A) for each
A 2 2A; then u(’i(c);ci) ￿ u(’j(c);cj): That is, no agent is punished for having lower costs than
others.
The following result follows from our Theorem 1 and results in Atlamaz and Yengin (2008). This
result reinforces the appeal of our mechanisms presented in Theorem 1.
Remark 1. On the additive domain or when there is a single-task, the following statements are
equivalent:
(i) a Groves mechanism Gh;￿ belongs to F2,
(ii) Gh;￿ is as in Theorem 1b: it generates the minimal de￿cit for each economy among all Groves
mechanisms that respect the identical-preferences lower-bound,
11Moulin (2009) states that when there is a single task, the e¢ ciency loss of these mechanisms is the smallest among
all Groves mechanisms.
10(iii) Gh;￿ generates the smallest de￿cit for each economy among all 1-fair Groves mechanisms,
(iv) Gh;￿ generates the smallest de￿cit for each economy among all order-preserving Groves mecha-
nisms satisfying k-fairness for k 2 f2;3;:::;ng;








Note that IPLB requires that each agent i￿ s utility is at least as much as the common utility at a
Pareto-e¢ cient and egalitarian allocation at i0s reference economy ci: On the other hand, 1-fairness
requires that each agent￿ s utility is at least as much as the common utility at a Pareto-e¢ cient
and egalitarian allocation in the actual economy c: By Remark 1ii and iii, on the additive domain,
we have the surprising result that the two requirements coincide under assignment-e¢ ciency and
strategy-proofness.
By Green and La⁄ont (1977), no assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof mechanism balances the
budget. Fortunately, there are Groves mechanisms that respect an upper bound on total transfer
(budget de￿cit). On the additive domain, by Remark 1v, a Groves mechanism respects IPLB and




[2]￿W(c;A) if and only if it is as in Theorem 1b:
When there is a single task, this upper bound on de￿cit is the di⁄erence of the second lowest cost
and the lowest cost in the economy.
Our model is also related to the one in Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002). They study problems
where a group of agents have to choose one out of several projects. Their model also applies to the
NIMBY problem where one agent has to be chosen to host a single noxious facility (see Section III
in Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002). In their model, each agent i o⁄ers a vector of bids, (bi
j)j2N
where bi
j is the amount of money i is willing to pay if agent j hosts the facility. The bids of an agent
has to add up to zero and the project with the highest aggregate bid is chosen (i.e. agent j who
receives the highest aggregate bid hosts the facility/is assigned the task).12 At the Nash equilibrium,
the payment of each agent is exactly equal to her bid and the bid of an agent can be di⁄erent than
her valuation for the project.
Let us contrast the di⁄erences between our model with the one in Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein
(2002): In their set up, one agent need to be chosen to host a single facility whereas we study the
general case where there may be multiple facilities that have to be hosted and each agent can also
host more than one facility. Their set up covers cases where there may be externalities in the sense
that who hosts what facility may a⁄ect an agent￿ s utility. On the other hand, in our model, each
agent￿ s utility only depends on the tasks she is assigned (the facilities she is hosting). In their set
up, the agents report their bids to the center, the bids are used to ￿nd Nash equilibria, and each
Nash equilibrium realizes an e¢ cient assignment. The transfers are equal to the negative of the bids.
On the other hand, in our set up, agents report their costs for hosting facilities (valuations for the
projects), the center uses these costs to determine an e¢ cient assignment and transfers. The transfer
of an agent can be di⁄erent than her cost.
Now, lets compare our mechanisms in Theorem 1 with the multibidding mechanism in Perez-
Castrillo and Wettstein (2002). To make an easy comparison, assume that there is a single facility
to host as is the case in Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein.
(i) The multibidding mechanism relies on complete information and the Nash equilibrium out-
comes are selected, whereas we do not need complete information and our mechanisms are strategy-
proof (truthful revelation of costs is a weakly dominant strategy for each agent).
(ii) All of the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the multibidding mechanism are assignment-e¢ cient.
On the other hand, our mechanisms always choose an e¢ cient assignment by construction.
12See Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002), for the tie-breaking process.
11(iii) The multibidding mechanism is budget-balanced since in any Nash equilibrium, the aggregate
bid is zero. On the other hand, our mechanisms in Theorem 1 generate non-negative de￿cits that are
bounded above by the di⁄erence of second lowest cost and the lowest cost to host the facility. Also,
our mechanisms minimize the de￿cit among all Groves mechanisms that respect IPLB.
(iv) In their model, in any Nash equilibrium, each agent￿ s utility is at least the expected utility
she would obtain if all agents are equally likely to host the facility. Moreover, any e¢ cient assignment
that generates utilities respecting such a welfare lower bound can be obtained as a Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, our mechanisms respect IPLB.
One may wonder whether the Nash outcomes of the multibidding mechanism or the mechanisms
in our Theorem 1 generate higher utilities. Since in our model, we do not have the information
of what the value of a facility to an agent i is when another agent j hosts the facility, it is not
straightforward to translate the welfare lower-bound of Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) to our
setting. However, one way to adapt the idea of their welfare lower-bound to our setting with single
facility ￿ is as follows:







To see how we formulate EULB, note that each agent is equally likely to host the facility with
probability 1=n: If agent j is assigned the task of hosting the facility, then, since all agents are equally
responsible to share the total cost, we may argue that the utility of each agent should be ￿ 1
nc￿
j : Thus,






When there is a single task, IPLB requires that for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN; u(’i(c);ci) ￿
￿ 1
nc￿
i since W(ci;f￿g) = c￿





j may be smaller or bigger than ￿ 1
nc￿
i depending on
the cost pro￿le. Hence, in general, there is no logical relation between EULB and IPLB. However, we
show that under assignment-e¢ ciency and strategy-proofness and when there is a single-task, IPLB
implies EULB.
Proposition 1. When there is a single task, if a Groves mechanism respects the identical-preferences
lower-bound, then it respects the expected-utility lower-bound.
5 Concluding Remarks
The identical-preferences lower-bound is appealing in problems where agents are responsible for
their own preferences and costs while the center wants to insure them against the heterogeneity in
preferences for which the agent is not responsible. This welfare lower-bound has been studied in
several models except for the one we considered in this paper. The mechanisms we characterized in
Theorem 1 are the only assignment-e¢ cient and strategy-proof ones that respect IPLB and minimize
the de￿cit for each economy. In most NIMBY problems, the question is to site a single noxious facility.
Our results indicate that the mechanisms in Theorem 1 are very appealing for this case as well (see
Remark 1) since they satisfy no-envy, 1￿fairness, and order-preservation, generate bounded de￿cits,
and also respect EULB.
6 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
a) For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un; let fci;e cig ￿ Cun be such that for each A 2 2A;
ci(A) ￿ maxf0;W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g; (12)
e ci(A) ￿ maxf0;W(c;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g: (13)
12￿If￿Part: Let h be as in (3) in Lemma 1. Note that for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un;
W(c;A) = min
A22Afci(A) + W(c￿i;AnA)g: (14)
That is, for each i 2 N; each c 2 CN
un; and each A 2 2A; W(c;A) ￿ ci(A) + W(c￿i;AnA): Hence,
ci(A) ￿ maxf0;W(c;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g (15)
with equality for some A 2 2A (note that A may be empty):
￿ Claim 1: For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un;
W(ci;A) ￿ W(e ci;A):
Proof of Claim 1: Let i 2 N and c 2 CN
un: By (13) and (15), for each A 2 2A; ci(A) ￿ e ci(A): Hence,
W(ci;A) ￿ W(e ci;A): ￿









Proof of Claim 2: Let i 2 N and c 2 CN
un. Let W(c;A) = W(c￿i;A) ￿ r for some r 2 [0;W(c￿i;A)].
Note that for each A 2 2A;
maxf0;W(c￿i;A) ￿ r ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g ￿ maxf0;W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA)g ￿ r:
That is, for each A 2 2A; e ci(A) ￿ ci(A) ￿ r:
For each A 2 2A; let di(A) ￿ ci(A) ￿ r: Note that e ci = (e ci
j)j2N where for each j 2 N; e ci
j = e ci: Since
for each A 2 2A; e ci(A) ￿ di(A); we have
W(e ci;A) = minf
X
j2N
e ci(Aj) : (Aj)j2N 2 A(A)g ￿ minf
X
j2N






















ci(Aj) : (Aj)j2N 2 A(A)g ￿ nr;
= W(ci;A) ￿ nr: (18)
















13Hence, we obtain (16). ￿
By Claims 1 and 2, for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un; W(c￿i;A)￿ 1
nW(ci;A) ￿ W(c;A)￿ 1
nW(ci;A):
This inequality and (3) together imply that for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN
un;
hi(c￿i) ￿ W(c;A) ￿ 1
nW(ci;A): By equation (1), on the unrestricted domain, Gh;￿ respects
IPLB. ￿
￿Only If￿Part: Let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that respects IPLB on the unrestricted domain.
Assume, by contradiction, that there are i 2 N and c 2 CN
un such that




Let b c = (ci;c￿i) 2 CN
un: Since b c￿i = c￿i, by equation (1) and IPLB,




By (12) and (14), W(b c;A) = W(c￿i;A). This equality and (21) together contradict (20). ￿
b)￿If￿Part: Let h 2 H be as in (4) in Lemma 1 and C 2 fCad;Csubg:
￿ Claim: For each i 2 N and each c 2 CN;
n ￿ 1
n




Proof of the Claim: Assume, by contradiction, that there are i 2 N and c 2 CN such that
n ￿ 1
n




Note that on the additive and the subadditive domains, for each ci 2 C; W(ci;A) = ci(A): This
equality and (23) together imply 1
nci(A) < ￿(W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c;A)) + 1
nW(c￿i;A): This inequality
and the fact that for each ci 2 C; W(c;A) ￿ W(c￿i;A) together imply
ci(A) < W(c￿i;A): (24)








Inequalities (23) and (25) together imply W(c￿i;A) < ci(A); which contradicts (24). ￿
By (4) and (22), for each i 2 N and each c 2 CN; hi(c￿i) ￿ W(c;A) ￿ 1
nW(ci;A): By equation (1),
Gh;￿ respects IPLB on the additive and the subadditive domains. ￿
￿Only If￿ Part: Let Gh;￿ be a Groves mechanism that respects IPLB on the additive or the






If CN = CN
ad; then let b ci 2 Cad be such that for each A 2 2A; b ci(A) = W(c￿i;A) ￿ W(c￿i;AnA): Note
that (b ci;c￿i) 2 CN
ad.
14If CN = CN
sub; then let b ci 2 Csub be such that for each A 2 2A; b ci(A) = W(c￿i;A): Note that
(b ci;c￿i) 2 CN
sub.
Let b c = (b ci;c￿i): The fact that b c￿i = c￿i, equation (1), and IPLB together imply
hi(c￿i) ￿ W(b ci;c￿i;A) ￿
1
n
W(b c i;A): (27)
Note that W(b ci;c￿i;A) = W(c￿i;A) = W(b c i;A): These equalities and (27) together imply
hi(c￿i) ￿ n￿1
n W(c￿i;A); which contradicts (26). ￿￿
Proof of Theorem 1:












hi(c￿i) should be minimized: For each i 2 N; by IPLB, hi(c￿i) has to be as




hi(c￿i), (3) ((4)) should hold as an equality on the unrestricted domain (on the
additive or the subadditive domain). ￿
Proof of Proposition 1: Let A = f￿g and Gh;￿ be as in Theorem 1b. Then, for each i 2 N




￿i)[1]: Let k 2 N be an agent with the lowest
cost. Then, for each i 2 Nnfkg; (c￿
￿i)[1] = c￿
[1] = c￿










j : That is, for each i 2 Nnfkg; u(’i(c);ci) = ￿ 1
nc￿





j : Note that
by Remark 1, Gh;￿ satis￿es order-preservation. Then, since for each i 2 Nnfkg; c￿
k ￿ c￿
i ; we have





j : Therefore, the Groves mechanisms in Theorem 1b respect
EULB. Note that if a Groves mechanism respects IPLB, then the utilities it generates are at least as
much as the ones generated by the mechanisms in Theorem 1. Thus, if a Groves mechanism respects
IPLB, then it respects EULB. ￿
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